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The paper discusses the question “what is mathematics” from a point of view
inspired by anthropology. In this perspective, the character of mathematical
thinking and argument is strongly affected – almost essentially determined,
indeed – by the dynamics of the specific social, mostly professional environments
by which it is carried. Environments where future practitioners are taught as
apprentices produce an approach different from that resulting from teaching
in a school – the latter inviting to intra-mathematical explanation in a way the
former does not. Moreover, once the interaction with the early classical Greek
philosophical quest for causes and general explanations had caused mathematical
explanation to become an autonomous endeavour in the shape of explicit proof
and deductivity, proof and deductivity presented themselves as options –
sometimes exploited, sometimes not – even in the teaching of mathematics for
practitioners.
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An introduction
What is mathematics? Is it Euclid, and when really sophisticated, Archimedes,
and what they are supposed to stand for? That is, exact proof?
Or is it what mathematicians do? Or, what engineers or carpenters do when
planning something?
Or, is it what all of us do when planning certain tasks where the aspects
of number and quantity can be dealt with in abstraction from other aspects? For
example, what comes into play when I plan to construct some bookshelves,
measure the wall where they are to stand, and calculate the dimension of the
boards to be used, leaving out of consideration the colour of the wood (and, at
my risk, leave their weight and elasticity out of sight, even though these are
things an engineer would take into account in corresponding mathematical
calculations)?
The preceding suggestions touch at many aspects of our question; dealing
with these we shall encounter new questions and new interactions; available
space, but only that, will prevent us from continuing indefinitely.
Let us first concentrate on the mathematics that is involved in some kind
of professional activity (after all, my non-professional bookshelf calculations are
simplified variants of what a carpenter would do).
As a historian I shall look at this in a perspective that reaches back to the
Bronze Age, in the hope shared by many historians that this Verfremdung will
make it easier to understand features of our own situation that are too familiar
to be noticed.
This evidently raises the question about the point in history where it is
possible to speak about mathematics in a way that makes sense in the present
world.
I shall propose absolute no date. Instead, as on earlier occasions (for example,
[Høyrup 1994: 67f]), I shall define
the transition to mathematics as the point where preexistent and previously
independent mathematical practices are coordinated through a minimum of at
least intuitively grasped understanding of formal relations. Remaining ambiguities
I shall accept as an unavoidable ingredient of human existence.
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Practitioners
It does not follow from this definition but seems to be the case in actual
history that the transition occurred only when mathematical techniques were
wielded not only by specialists but by specialists who were somehow organized
professionally and thus also linked in a network of communication. According
to studies of ethnomathematics as defined in [Ascher & Ascher 1986: 125], that
is, as “the study of mathematical ideas of non-literate people”,1 what me may
see as an integrated whole and label ethnomathematics in its original context
will mostly consist of unconnected mathematical techniques (that is, integrated
with other facets of culture but not with each other). This is at least the
impression conveyed by for example Paulus Gerdes’ and Marcia Ascher’s
publications; we may explain marriage rules and the construction of string- or
sand-drawn figures by one and the same group theory, but this is our connection.
Not everybody in such societies are equally skilled in using the techniques, and
those who are particularly skilled may guard their knowledge jealously – see,
for example [Gerdes 1997: 32–36]. They may even make up a recognized and
respected group; but they do not make their living from that.
Integrated mathematics appears to arise with that social complexity and
particular division of labour which historically goes together with early state
formation and the development of writing or some equivalent recording system
like the Inka quipus.2 The case we know best (yet not as well as we would like)
is late fourth-millennium BCE southern Mesopotamia. Here, the earliest state-like
social system developed in the city Uruk around the large temples. The
priesthood of these created a pictographic script and a numerico-metrological
1 It should be remembered that the concept as defined by Ubiratan d’Ambrosio [1987:
15] is quite different (my English translation, as everywhere in the following where
nothing else is indicated
Ethnomathematics implies a very broad conceptualization of “ethnic” and of
mathematics. Much more than just being associated with ethnicities, “ethnic”
refers to identifiable cultural groups, such as national-tribal societies, trade unions
and professional groups, children of a certain age group, etc.
while mathematics includes counting, measuring, accounting, classifying, ordering,
inferring and modelling. Under this definition, “ethnomathematics” will certainly often
encompass integrated mathematics. D’Ambrosio justly characterizes it as “anthropological
mathematics” – in principle thus more or less what I am addressing here.
2 Like early Mesopotamian writing, the quipus primarily served accounting and administra-
tion, but they could also (in ways we do not understand) encode information about the
structure of the state or society [d’Altroy 2015: 6f].
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system, the latter used for accounting, the former providing context (“from whom
to whom”, etc.) – and the numerico-metrological system bears witness of
integration of length- and area metrologies and of a general idea of sub-unit
across the various metrologies. [Høyrup 2009: 18–28] presents an overview and
further references to the indirect evidence drawn upon.
Use of this body of integrated mathematical knowledge was the privilege
of the same stratum of manager-priests that had created it; it was thus carried
by a professional group.
According to the way their knowledge is transmitted, such professional
groups fall into two main types (as always in such cases, transition forms can
be identified; for the sake of clarity I shall stick to the main types). In one type,
knowledge is transmitted within an apprenticeship-system of “learning by doing
under supervision”. The other type involves some kind of school, that is, teaching
separate from actual work.
In the former type, those who transmit are actively involved in the practical
activities of their trade; they will tend to train exactly what is needed, and the
understanding they will try to communicate will be that of practical procedures –
and they will try to make the apprentice work usefully as early as possible.
In pre-modern times, training of the apprenticeship-based type will usually
have been “culturally oral” (which does not mean that no practitioners would
be able to read and write).3 However, the early Mesopotamian temple system
(whose literacy was anyhow rudimentary and not fit for carrying any communica-
tion beyond that of accounts) appears to be an exception in as far as its
mathematics teaching is concerned; while writing was trained by means of sign
lists, which point to the existence of some kind of school, the only evidence we
have of mathematics teaching consists of “model documents”, differing from
real administrative documents only by the appearance of suspiciously nice
numbers and by the absence of an official’s seal.
School teaching of mathematical skill, on the other hand, in need of a virtual
representation of future practice, is – probably by necessity and at least according
to historical experience – bound to a writing system extensive enough to carry
a literate culture.
Teachers in the school type may well have as their aim to impart knowledge
for practice. However, the practice with which professional teachers are most
3 On oral and literate culture types, see various works by Walter Ong – e.g., [1977; 1982] –
and Jack Goody – not least, [Goody 1987].
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familiar cannot avoid being that of teaching. In the case where mathematics is
what they teach (at whatever historical and age level) and in case they aim at
conveying as much understanding as facilitates learning on part of those who
are taught, that understanding will easily concentrate on inner connections of
the topic – that is, on mathematical explanation.
So much for the moment about teaching types. Another point to take into
account is the nature of professions. These are groups engaged in a particular niche
of the social division of labour – accounting, surveying, cathedral building,
dentistry, the administration of law, to mention just a few random possibilities,
of which the first three at least involve some wielding of mathematical
techniques. But they are also social groups kept together not only by similarity
of tasks but also by awareness and pride of appurtenance to a group with an
expertise that non-members do not possess.
Such expertise, of course, has to demonstrated, and everyday work will only
call for everyday skills – not sufficient to display stunning expertise. In the case
where mathematical expertise is involved, the need for display gives rise to a
request to be able to solve questions apparently pertinent to the chore of the
profession but more intricate than what will be encountered in daily practice;
perhaps even so artificial that they will never turn up in actual practice, and at
best so striking that they may impress outsiders – mathematical Eiffel towers,
so to speak. I shall refer to them as “supra-utilitarian”. In particular within an
apprenticeship-based environment, they will often have the character of genuine
riddles, in agreement with the eristic character of oral culture.
As an example we may think of the problem of the “100 fowls”, a merchants’
and accountants’ riddle. In average formulation it might run
I go to the market and buy 100 fowls for 100 coins. I get a goose for 5 coins, a
hen for 2 coins, and three sparrows for 1 coin. What did I buy?
There are two solutions (one is 5 geese, 26 hens and 69 sparrows); with other
numbers we may get many more. But that does not matter, a riddle is correctly
answered by one valid answer.
Such problems are known as “recreational”, but with regard to their original
function this is a misnomer. There, in terms familiar to anthropologists, they
were “neck riddles” – who can solve them belongs to the group, who cannot
will be kept outside.4 They became matters of recreation once mathematical
4 This explanation at the level of sociology does not contradict an individual motivation
from the pleasure of “being able” – the kind of “power” spoken of by Christoph
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literacy became widespread (but then new types developed corresponding to
the level of mathematical professionals of the new era, cf. below).
Even when such riddles are apparently mathematical, the expected solution
need not be mathematically correct, as we sometimes see where such oral riddles
are adopted directly into written problem collections. In one, the eighth-century
Frankish Propositiones ad acuendos juvenes [ed. Folkerts 1978: 47], two merchants
are supposed to buy swines and sell them at the same price with a profit. Of
course there is a fallacy, but it is easily overlooked. Such mock solutions illustrate
that we are really dealing with riddles – we may think of the riddle of the sphinx
(neck riddle if ever there was): only by understanding “morning” as “childhood”,
“noon” as “adulthood” and “evening” as “old age” is Oedipus able to solve it
and save his life.
In any practice making use of mathematical knowledge, the problem to be
solved is primary, and methods have to be developed and chosen is order to
solve it; that is, methods are subordinate. That relation is turned around in the
kind of mathematics that serves to display dexterity, professional or otherwise.
This holds even today (and not only in mathematics) if you want to display your
abilities in order to earn a degree and hopefully get a corresponding position:
then, if you are cautious, you choose (or your doctoral advisor responsibly helps
you choose) a problem that methods with which you are or can become familiar
are liable to attack successfully.
There is, however, a difference between the way in which this quest for
impressive display manifests itself in the apprenticeship- and the school-based
situation. In an apprenticeship-based system, a small collection of riddles may
serve the purpose – the master of the apprentice will not waste time that could
be used profitably on systematic training of such matters. That is why the “100
fowls” could circulate between China, India, the Islamic world and Western
Europe from the fifth century CE onward, only with the variation in India that
4 species are bought instead of three, and that the Propositiones ad acuendos juvenes
speak about other kinds of animals.5
In a school situation, however, the training of mathematical competence per
se calls for a systematic approach and thereby also for repetition with variation.
That has several consequences, not only in school but also in the professional
Scriba [1992]. But only where such individual pleasure is in agreement with sociologically
determined forces can it be stabilized as more than an individual accident.
5 A survey of select appearances will be found in [Tropfke/Vogel et al 198: 613–616].
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culture produced by schooling. Firstly, looking for instance at the way the “100
fowls” appear in the Italian late medieval “abbacus books”,6 we see that not
only the prices but also the number of fowls and the total price vary. Next, it
may induce some teachers to look for new problem types that can be solved by
the methods at hand and for possible expansions of the range of available
methods; both get us close to what may be called research, even though the
process could not be conceptualized as such in a world where it did not
correspond to a systematic effort – actually, the separation of the concept of
“[scientific] research” from the general idea of close scrutiny appears to belong
to the late 19th or even the early 20th century.7
A Mesopotamian example may illustrate and clarify this.8 Already around
25509 BCE, a profession of scribes separate from the leading stratum of temple
managers had emerged; surveyor-scribes also appear to have formed a distinct
group, separate for example from those scribes who would draw up contracts.
Before 2300 BCE, it appears that lay (that is, non-scribal), Akkadian-speaking10
surveyors were active, perhaps only in central Iraq and not in the Sumerian
south; alternatively, such a lay group grew out during the next few centuries
from the teaching of surveyor-scribes in the Sumerian school. In any case,
surveyor-apprentices or -students were trained not only in area calculation but
also in “reverse area calculation” – that is, in finding one side of a rectangle from
the other side and the area (a problem that would never present itself in
surveying practice but probably served to train the metrological system – think
of solving the problem if the area is expressed in acres and the known side in
yards, feet, inches and lines). After a period (the 21st c. BCE) during which the
Sumerian scribe school, the pivot of an extremely centralized economy, had
taught only the practically necessary in mathematics, leaving once again no traces
6 Not textbooks for but reflecting the teaching in the abbacus school, a school mainly for
merchants’ and artisans’ sons of age c. 11–12 years.
7 Thus according to the examples in Oxford English Dictionary and the Grand Larousse. Only
German Forschung/forschen begin approaching the modern concept of systematic search
for knowledge about a specific field with Goethe and the Romantic movement (according
to the Deutsches Wörterbuch of the Grimm brothers).
8 Once more, [Høyrup 2009] may serve as a basic reference.
9 I follow the “middle chronology”.
10 Sumerian was the dominant language in the south, Akkadian (a Semitic language later
represented by the Babylonian and Assyrian dialects) was spoken in the centre and the
north but was also present in the south around 2500 BCE.
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of mathematics teaching beyond “model documents”, the “Old Babylonian”11
scribal school looked for ways to express scribal identity. As far as mathematics
is concerned, it drew for this purpose mainly on the riddles of lay practitioners,
in particular (but not exclusively) those of the Akkadian-speaking surveyors.
Already around 2200 BCE, as we have seen, the
surveyors solved supra-utilitarian problems about a
rectangle where the area is known together with the
length or the width. At some moment between 2200 and
1800 BCE a trick had been discovered that allows to solve
two apparently similar but actually quite different
problems: namely to find the sides from the area and the
sum of or the difference between the sides. The diagram
shows how the latter case is solved by means of a
quadratic completion: We know the area to be 60, while
the excess of the length over the width is 4. We bisect
the excess of the length over the width, and move the
outer part around so as to produce a gnomon, still
obviously with area 60. The missing small square has the
side 2 and thus the area 4; joining this to the gnomon,
we get a large square with area 64 and hence side 8.
Moving the part that was moved back into its original
position we find the width to be 8–2 = 6, and the length to be 8+2 = 10. The
method for known sum is different but similar.
Among the lay surveyors a small set of riddles circulated that could be solved
by means of this trick. Later sources allow us to identify them and sometimes
even allow us to know the numerical parameters. The original set seems to have
encompassed the following problems about squares and rectangles:
s+ (s) = 110
4s+ (s) = 140
(s)–s = 90
(s)– 4s = 60 (?)
+w = α , ( ,w ) = β
–w = α , ( ,w ) = β
11 Technically, “Old Babylonian” designates the period 2000–1600 BCE; socially and
culturally, however, the first century or so was an age of transition; the characteristic
Old Babylonian socio-cultural complex only stands out from around 1850.
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+w = α , ( –w )+ ( ,w ) = β
–w = α , ( +w )+ ( ,w ) = β;
d = α , ( ,w ) = β .
Here, s stands for the side of a square, 4s for “all 4 sides”, (s) for the area, and
d finally for the diagonal; ( , w ) stands for the area of a rectangle with sides
and w ; the solution of the diagonal problem presupposes familiarity with the
“Pythagorean rule”, which can also be derived by means of cut-and-paste
manipulations.
Beyond these, there were problems about two squares (sum of or difference
between the sides given together with the sum of or difference between the
areas); a problem in which the sum of the perimeter, the diameter and the area
of a circle is given, and possibly the problem d–s = 4 concerning a square, with
the pseudo-solution s = 10, d = 14. That was probably all.
The first thing to happen when these riddles were adopted by the school
was an extension to questions about more complex geometrical configurations
like subdivided trapezia that could be reduced to one of the standard problems
about rectangles or squares. This appears to have happened in Eshnunna, a region
to the north-east of Babylon shortly after 1800 BCE. This extension already asked
for the generalization of a trick so far only used for the circle problem, a change
of scale in one dimension which transforms a problem α (s)+βs = γ into a
problem (αs)+β (αs) = αγ, that is, a familiar problem type, only dealing with
a square with side αs instead of s. In technical mathematical terms, the operation
is a normalization, which allows the treatment of problems with general
coefficients.12
When Eshnunna was conquered and destroyed by Hammurabi around 1760
BCE, the tradition moved to the south, where the old scribal tradition was
stronger; here, it was discovered and exploited that it was possible to formulate
problems dealing with other entities familiar from scribal practice whose structure
could be represented by square or rectangular areas and their sides. So, we find
problems about manpower, brick production, prices, or pairs of numbers from
the table of reciprocals – all of them, as closer inspection shows, far away from
12 We notice that the surveyors’ riddles involve no (or, termed differently, only “natural”)
coefficients: the area, the side of all four sides, etc. Nothing like 2/3 of a square area and
1/3 of the side. This characteristic, we may say, fits their riddle character – a riddle should
be puzzling because it is difficult to see how to answer it, but its formulation should be
without technicalities.
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what would be encountered in real scribal practice, and thus supra-utilitarian.
We also find problems that extrapolate the problem about the sum of a square
area and its side, namely to a problem about the sum of a cubic volume and
its base, and other similar cubic problems. These, the school teachers will have
discovered, could not be solved by the methods at hand.13 They were able to
develop methods that worked, however, (though only on the condition that a
nice integer solution exists, which means that these methods could serve for
nothing outside the realm of school problems): use of a table n n (n+1), and
factorization.
In the late 17th century BCE, at least one school also engaged in an endeavour
of large-scale systematization.
And then, in 1595, a Hittite raid resulted in the collapse of the Old Babylonian
statal and social system, already weakened by a variety of difficulties. The Old
Babylonian school disappeared, and so did the kind of mathematics it had
created. Lay mensurational practice survived, however; even its riddles survived,
and in later times they were adopted anew by environments that could use them
in new ways.
Proof
One such environment was that of Greek “philosophical mathematics”, within
which we encounter them in another important role. But first some general
background.
The first proposed answer to the initial question “what is mathematics” was
approximately “Euclid and what he is supposed to stands for – that is, exact
proof”.
Euclid no doubt was Greek, or at least writing in Greek during the early
Hellenistic period. But did proof begin with the Greeks?
The answer, as mostly, depends on a conceptual delimitation (more or less
what Euclid himself did when borrowing from earlier writers the “definition”
of a line as “a length without breadth”). At least the Greeks were not the first
to use arguments when teaching mathematics. They may, however, have been
the first to make mathematical argument an endeavour on its own.
Let us return to the Old Babylonian school. In a way the pertinence of the
13 Actually they almost can; Cardano’s way to solve the general cubic equation combines
tricks that are all found in Old Babylonian mathematics. But nobody before him made
the combination, and that they can be combined in this way is only obvious when they
are translated into algebraic symbolism.
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above cut-and-paste manipulations is in no need of proof, it is “obvious” that
they lead to the result – just as we feel no need for proof when manipulating
an algebraic equation (for simplicity excluding negative numbers):














⇔ (x+ )2 = 11
2
⇔ x+ = = 11
2
1




Even here we “see” naively that what is done must be correct.
Already in the 1930s, before the geometric basis for the Babylonian
procedures was understood and when the solutions seemed to consist of nothing
but a sequence of unexplained numerical operations, Otto Neugebauer pointed
out that the actual teaching would have involved explanations and understanding
of why the procedures worked – many of them are far to complicated to have
been found by trial and error or to have been communicated meaningfully by
rote learning. Since then, some texts have been found that confirm this – they
do not solve problems but explain what goes on in the procedure.
One example looks at how the “rectangle equa-
tion” “length+width+area = 1” is transformed – see
the diagram. Already in the beginning the values
of the length and the width are stated – clearly, no
problem is to be solved. Then it is explained that
the length and the width are prolonged by 1, which
produces two extra rectangles, with areas
respectively equal to the width and to the length;
the sum of the shaded areas is thus 1. The new
rectangles contain an empty square of area 1×1 = 1; when this square is added,
the total area will be 2. Next it is shown that the rectangle contained by the
prolonged length 11/2 and the prolonged width 1
1/3 is indeed 2. No strict proof,
of course, but a pedagogical explanation which allows the student to understand
why things work.
Such pedagogical explanations are not all, however; on several points, the
Old Babylonian teachers can be seen to have engaged in critique in the Kantian
sense – asking in which sense and under which conditions what they did was
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valid. What we have just seen is an example of this. The surveyors’ riddles had
been based on a notion of “broad lines”, lines carrying a virtual width of one
length unit; some early school problems do the same. Soon, however, some school
masters found that unsatisfactory, and they introduced the trick of replacing
the lines by rectangles with an explicit width 1. Since this width is termed in
no less than three different ways in the corpus, we may presume the device to
have been invented several times.
Another example can be seen in the above solution of the problem in which
the area of a rectangle is given together width the difference between the sides.
Here, early specimens tend to make the final step with the words “join and tear
out”, and to state the two results immediately afterwards; the Babylonians, as
we, would indeed speak of addition before subtraction if nothing prevented it.
Here, however, some schoolmasters must have discovered a difficulty; it is in
principle impossible to join the piece that is moved back into its original position
before it is at disposal, that is, before it has been torn out. They therefore would
first tear out, and next, in a separate step, join (as I did above).
However, critique was even less of a systematic effort than the search for
new applications and new methods; it was apparently an occasional spin-off
from didactical explanation, felt to be necessary by teachers who taught
mathematics professionally.
We have no sources for going into similar details concerning the other early
written mathematical tradition – that of second-millennium Pharaonic mathemat-
ics; even here, however, there are traces of oral explanations, and many of the
procedures we find are too complicated to have been transmitted without
explanations, and certainly too sophisticated to have been found without
understanding. Explicit proof was almost certainly absent; whether the canon
that did not allow repetition in the writing of sums of aliquot fractions14 is a
matter of conjecture – my personal feeling is that aesthetics, not critique was
involved, but this is a feeling and nothing more.
What we know about ancient Chinese mathematics concerns a much later
date – even the bamboo strip books found during the latest decades postdate
Euclid. Here too, however, there is no doubt that explanations must have been
given, even though we do not know possess any in writing earlier than Liu Hui’s
mid-third century CE commentary to the Nine Chapters about Mathematical
Procedures. One feature of this commentary is noteworthy in the present




ostracized although a couple of writing errors indicate that the idea was familiar.
- 11 -
connection, and distinguishes it from anything we find in Mesopotamian or
(trace-wise) in Pharaonic mathematics. Mesopotamian and Pharaonic explanations
(as well as those of Euclid) keep strictly within the domain of mathematics. Even
Plato and Aristotle use mathematics to illustrate philosophical points, but they
do not explain what mathematicians do or should do from philosophy.15
Lui Hui’s commentary is (partially) different. As has been pointed out by
Karine Chemla [1997], Liu Hui, when commenting upon algorithms that stepwise
transform the givens of a question, applies the language which the Book of Changes
(Yijing) uses for describing real-world transformations. We find something similar
in the commentaries in one of the 12th-century Latin versions of the Elements,
and in that case the obvious reason is that those who made it and those for whom
it was made were steeped in the whole of philosophy and not professionally
specializing in mathematics. We know nothing about the life of Liu Hui, but
we may legitimately expect something similar – indeed, those Chinese high
officials who were responsible for taxation, manpower planning, public works,
etc. – that is, those who were studying the Nine Chapters – were all literary
scholars: that was the only way to become an official.
Let us now turn to classical Greece, where mathematical argument – probably
for the first time in history – emancipated itself from its subservience to teaching,
and somehow became a distinctive characteristic of the μαθηματα, paradoxically
“the matters to be taught” par excellence.
Some 250 years after his times, Thales of Miletos was supposed to have
introduced the “theory” (θεωρια) of geometry to Greece from Egypt, and for
instance to have proved that at circle is bisected by a diameter.16 The historical
truth in the claim is uncertain at best, but it calls for two observations. Firstly,
what is attributed to Thales is proof, not discovery. Secondly, his geometry is
supposed to be theory, something to be contemplated, not something to be used
professionally. This is the image Greek philosophers had of the emergence of
geometry around 300 BCE, but it also agrees with the general emergence of Greek
philosophy in the sixth and fifth century with its questions for causes and for
the nature of things. Sixth- and fifth-century natural philosophy, however, was
15 Plato tries (for instance, Republic 527A–B, and onward), but he does it in terms so general
that they do not prescribe what mathematicians should do, nor why something is true
or false.
16 The information comes from Proclos’ commentary to Elements I [ed. Friedlein 1873: 65,
157] from the late fifth century CE, but on these points Proclos builds on Aristotle’s pupil
Eudemos.
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very different from that of Aristotle; already by analogy (but not only for that
reason) we should not expect the “theory” and “proofs” of early geometry to
be too similar to what we know from the century of Euclid and Archimedes.
We know that in the later fifth century BCE the problem of
incommensurability had already been discovered – there are discordant
hypotheses about how it happened, but at least for Aristotle the paradigmatic
example is the ratio between the side and the diagonal of a square. This, of
course, is truly a theoretical problem – for any practical purposes, also today,
rational approximations are necessary as well as sufficient. From the later fifth
century BCE we also have the first surviving piece of mathematical
argumentation – Hippocrates of Chios’ investigation of lunules, figures contained
by circular arcs, and we know that the same Hippocrates wrote a first collection
of Elements, probably for his private teaching of youths wishing to learn
mathematics as a “liberal” (not lucrative) art. During the same decades we know
that the famous “three problems” – squaring the circle, doubling the cube,
trisecting the angle – were modish enough for some sophists (living from teaching
adequate culture to upper-class youth) to take them up. We also know that what
Aristotle refers to as “the so-called Pythagoreans” were interested in some kind
of mathematics at the time, mixing it with numerology and their philosophy;
details, however, are in the dark (the claims of late ancient Neopythagoreans
are notoriously unreliable).
More comes from the writings of Plato and Aristotle. Plato (Republic 510C)
tells that those engaged in geometry distinguish acute, right and obtuse angles –
but these could also be practitioners, not all geometry of the epoch was of cause
“liberal”. Aristotle is much richer. He knows the Euclidean definition of a line
as a length without breadth (Topics 143b28–29), so geometers of his time had felt
the need to rule out the broad lines; he also knows (Physics 207b29–3117) that
geometers do not ask for the infinite but only for the possibility produce a finite
straight line as much as they wish, which is Euclid’s second postulate. Moreover,
the scientific method prescribed in his Second analytic is clearly inspired by the
methods of geometry, so at his time the ideal of axiomatization was clearly
present. Already Plato seems to have known it, but seeing it as a shortcoming
of mathematics that its proofs have to build on unproved foundations.18
17 In Prior Analytics II, 64b34–65a9 he more or less predicts the need to introduce the fifth
postulate in order to eliminate circular reasoning about parallels, showing thus that it
had not been done yet.
18 Therefore, mathematics is only useful as training of immature minds; true insight comes
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However, axiomatization was still an aim, not reality: Aristotle tells (First
Analytics 64b34–65a9) about those who prove the sum of the angles of a triangle
to be equal to two right angles by means of parallel lines, overlooking that the
existence of parallels is proved from the sum of the angles of a triangle (and
suggests a way out, namely to introduce a postulate19).
A number of highly competent mathematicians (not least Theaitetos,
Menaichmos and Eudoxos) collaborated at Plato’s Academy (not working there
only). They prepared the third-century final construction of the Euclidean
axiomatic system – not perfect, and subjected to pointwise criticism of single
definitions and postulates throughout antiquity, but never replaced by any
alternative (except the redaction which Theon of Alexandria prepared for
didactical purposes in the fourth century CE, and perhaps by other analogous
undertakings about which we have no information).
Also during the third century BCE, we see a number of more advanced
developments – Archimedes’s various works, both on mathematical mechanics
and on questions involving the infinitesimal method of exhaustion; Euclid’s and
later Apollonios’ work on conic sections; etc. Such advanced work had begun
already in the fourth century, before the full construction of an axiomatic system;
the outcome will certainly have been deductive, but its deductivity will initially
have been “local”, building on supposedly well-known foundations. This, and
not something like the Euclidean system, may have been what Plato thought
(and knew) about when speaking about the deficiencies of mathematical reason.
As an illustration of the relation and difference between Euclidean proofs
and the kind of explanations that could be given in a school for practitioners
we may look at Elements II.6. The words of the proposition may seem opaque:20
If a straight line be bisected and a straight line be added to it in a straight line,
the rectangle contained by the whole with the added straight line and the added
straight line together with the square on the half is equal to the square on the
straight line made up of the half and the added straight line.
However, looking at the diagram we recognize the situation. ADKM is a rec-
from dialectic, where everything is proved(Republic 531D–533C). Aristotle may hint at
this failing understanding when pointing out that all knowledge built on reason starts
from previous knowledge (First Analytic 71a1–2).
19 Euclid’s famous fifth postulate was meant to do the job, but in fact only does so when
combined with a fallacy in prop. I.16.
20 I use the translation in [Heath 1926: I, 385]. For convenience I also Heath’s diagram,
which only differs from the one in the critical edition by using Latin letters.
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tangle, whose length exceeds the width by
AB. Rectangle ACKL is half of the excess
rectangle, and equals rectangle HMGF,
while LHEG is a completing square. All
in all, we have precisely the same con-
figuration as in the Old Babylonian rec-
tangle problem that was described above.
Euclid’s innovation (apart from the
wording of the proposition) is in the proof.
Euclid does not simply cut, move around and paste. He carefully constructs by
means of parallels – the diagonal DE then serves to do so in such a way that
the rectangles ACKL and HMGF can be proved to be equal. All in all, what
Euclid does is to show that what was presupposed “naively” in the Old
Babylonian solution can be justified according to the best levels of theory.21
That is, the proposition in question is an instance of deliberate critique, putting
on a firmer base something which was already familiar. This can be stated about
the whole sequence II.1–10 – as it turns out [Mueller 1981: 301f], these
propositions are practically never used explicitly afterwards, their role is that
of critical consolidation of the well-known. Once that was established, they could
be tacitly used.
Not everything in Greek mathematics was such critique, far from. Most of
what we find in Euclid, Archimedes, Apollonios etc. was not only unknown to
the practitioners of earlier cultures, even their questions could not have been
imagined. We should not believe, on the other hand, that this high level (or
merely the first books of the Elements) was standard knowledge at the social level
where a “liberal education” was expected. Theon of Smyrna’s Exposition of the
Mathematical Topics Useful for Reading Plato (2nd c. CE) shows us how much
knowledge about mathematics could be expected by those who wanted to go
on with philosophical studies after having been taught the standard liberal arts –
certainly the group from which a maximum could be expected. Theon, as we
discover, starts from scratch – and he does not even arrive at mathematics with
proofs. We find explanations of concepts and of the relations between the
branches of mathematics, references to their appearance in general philosophical
and literary works, and observations of a numerological character – as the
21 Euclid certainly did not know about what had been done in Babylonia some 1400 years
before his time; but we have good evidence that the surveyors’ riddles were known in
the Mediterranean area during the classical epoch.
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twelfth-century commentary to the Elements evidence for the general culture and
interests of the expected audience. We may think of Liu Hui as a parallel, but
Lui Hui knew his mathematics, his philosophy is a supplement. Other handbooks
for the liberal arts confirm Theon’s picture, but suggest an even lower
mathematical level.
Even if we look at Platonizing, Neopythagorean or Neoplatonic philosophers
(with the exception of Proclos) we are up for a surprise. When writers like
Plutarch or Iamblichos know not only about mathematics – about its philosophical
status, about its ideological importance – but also some substance, what they
know comes not from Euclid or Archimedes but from the techniques of Near
Eastern practitioners – see [Høyrup 2000]. Already Hippocrates’ work on the
lunules and Theodoros’s investigation of irrationals, also from the late fifth
century BCE, appear to have been beyond their level; but a kind of mathematics
was around which they were able to understand. Like the alchemists, they
transformed the knowledge of practitioners into “wisdom”.
After the Greeks
The short “golden age” of Greek mathematics ended with the death of
Apollonios in the early second century BCE. It was followed by a silver age lasting
some seven centuries around the Eastern Mediterranean; neither the golden nor
the silver age ever really touched the western part except Magna Graecia. No
wonder then that the Early and Central Latin Middle Ages knew no mathematics
beyond what could be gained from the liberal-arts handbook tradition (including
presumably an epitome of the Elements expurgated of proofs); from the Roman
agrimensors; from Easter-reckoning; and from what could be made on these
foundations. In particular, we find no understanding of what a proof is beyond
ad-hoc explanation, not even among those who had gone through a Latin
education. But after all, these were administrators, and even if they were
nominally taught “liberal arts”, the meaning of this concept had changed into
the kind of knowledge fit for those who managed servile labour and were not
themselves of servile status.
Even after c. 1100 (that is, during the High and Late Middle Ages), most
vernacular professional mathematical practice retained this character – also the
Italian abbacus environment, which sometimes produced quite advanced results.
Anthropologically, or in terms of sociology of knowledge, such practice simply
continued pre-Greek normality (which, at that level, had never been interrupted,
neither in Aristotle’s Greece nor in Hellenistic Alexandria).
Among those who got a Latin education (at cathedral schools and, as these
- 16 -
emerged, universities), we see some change, at least from the late 12th century
onward: some Euclid entered the curriculum, though the philosophical emphasis
implied that the interest was often metamathematical rather than mathematical –
but that, on the other hand, meant that the notions of proof and axiomatic
method (after all, in harmony with Aristotle’s epistemology, which was well
studied at universities) came into focus. When university scholars wrote about
mathematics that was somehow practical (for example, about how to calculate
with Hindu-Arabic numerals, which served in astronomy and astrology, or about
the astrolabe), proof had thereby at least become an option; and when an abbacus
master like Luca Pacioli rose socially to becoming a scholar, he used the option.22
In the long run (very long), the result was the situation we know today: even
mathematics taught for practice is mostly supposed to build on a safe basis, that is, on
deductive proofs if not necessarily on an axiomatic system. Already in [1728: 867],
Friedrich Wolff wrote about “Mathesis practica, performing mathematics”, that
it is
the kind that performs something, that is, makes use of the understanding it
has attained, as when one measures widths and heights by means of similar
triangles, and lays out fields in the terrain. It is true that performing mathematics
can be learned without reasoning mathematics; but then one remains blind in
all affairs, achieves nothing with suitable precision and in the best way, at times
it may occur that one does not find one’s way at all. Not to mention that it is
easy to forget what one has learned, and that that which one has forgotten is
not so easily retrieved, because everything depends only on memory. Therefore
all master builders, engineers, calculators, artists and artisans who make use
of ruler and compass should have learned sufficient reasons for their doings from
theory: this would produce great utility for the human race. Since, the more
perfect the theory, the more correct will also every performance be.
This certainly did not by necessity ask for more reasons than what had been
given to Babylonian and Pharaonic scribe school students – but Wolff’s last period
points forward to the development which we have seen since the creation of
the École Polytechnique and the Technische Hochschulen, gradually spreading
in the 20th century to the schooling of humbler professions than civil engineers.
Once practitioners had learned (for instance) elementary algebra, the old
recreational riddles became uninteresting – they had become trivial, and could
move to the popular press and become truly recreational. But the phenomenon
of professional riddles did not disappear (although exam systems had made their
22 The medieval Islamic world offers a similar picture. For reasons of space I shall not
pursue the matter.
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role less serious and more a personal matter). As I was once told by Eduardo
Ortiz, the majority of the subscribers to the Journal de mathématiques élémentaires,
founded in 1877, were engineers, architects and military officers – the three most
important professions that were taught mathematics at a good level. In this
journal, they could find lots of problems, not least about triangles, on which to
sharpen their teeth (cf. also [Ortiz 1996: 335]).
As schooling was broadened to the whole population during the last
centuries, the general tendency was that mathematics in Greek style (really
Greek – until well into the 20th century, Euclid or something derived from Euclid
mostly served at least as the basis) was the privilege of the elite (felt rather as
a heavy burden by many); the “popular classes” were taught their practical
mathematics in a way Wolff would not always have approved of. As, officially,
the distinction between elite and mass education was abolished after the Second
World War, many ways have been tried; the new-math movement tried to base
everything on a new kind of demonstrated mathematics (à bas Euclide, plus de
triangles, in Dieudonné’s famous words). As transformation groups and Bourbaki
proved failures at school level, various other ways were tried – sometimes “back
to basics” (mere training of arithmetic), often reasoning not too different in style
(certainly in contents) from what we see reflected in the Old Babylonian texts.
Mathematics, taught in an organized way beyond the simplest matters, is
essentially based on argument. But the axiomatically secured foundation, once
the sine qua non for the discoveries of Archimedes and Apollonios but not
adopted by those of their contemporaries who made city planning, built
aqueducts or measured land, also today is often needed for the expansion of
advanced mathematical knowledge – yet apparently not for everyday uses of
the discoveries and knowledge of the day before yesterday.
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